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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
the fourth amendment warrant requirement 1 is first and foremost
a protection against unauthorized entry into a person's home.2 As
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. In 1925 the Court first held that the fourth amendment requires a warrant for the
search of a home. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925). Before Agnello, most
lower courts had assumed the same. Id. In Agnello the Supreme Court stressed the signifi-
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the Court continually has repeated, the "physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth
amendment is directed."'3 The Court, therefore, has held that
search or seizure inside a home without a warrant is "presumptively unreasonable." '4 The Court has dileneated carefully a few exceptions to the warrant requirement, but places a heavy burden on
the police to show exigent circumstances sufficient to fall within
one of these exceptions: 5 "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon," the process of destruction of evidence,7 or an ongoing fire."
Prior to 1984 the Supreme Court construed these exceptions
narrowly to preserve the sanctity of the home. In the recent case
Segura v. United States,9 however, two Justices endorsed a new
exception to the warrant requirement. Justices Burger and
O'Connor found that an eighteen to twenty hour warrantless occupation of a private dwelling to maintain the status quo in anticipacance of the warrant requirement: "The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in
itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws." Id. In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091
(1984), the Court recently reiterated that the warrant requirement is the principal protection against government officials' unreasonable intrusions into the home. Id. at 2097. But
see California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985) (stating that police do not need warrant to
search a mobile home because mobile homes are regulated vehicles that may be moved and
those characteristics reduce owners' expectations of privacy).
In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the Court set forth the reasons the
warrant requirement is necessary to protect the privacy interest of individuals in the home:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . The right of
officers to thrust themselves into a home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Id. at 13-14; see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) ("The purpose of a
warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause
to make an arrest or conduct a search.").
3. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972).
4. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971).
5. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
7. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
8. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
9. 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984).
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tion of a search warrant does not require exigent circumstances to
constitute a reasonable fourth amendment seizure.' 0
This Recent Development argues that although an opinion endorsed by only two justices is not binding precedent, this portion
of Segura represents an undesirable departure from the strict protections traditionally afforded a person's privacy interest in the
home and leaves lower courts confused about the constitutional
limitations on seizures in the home. Part II examines prior Supreme Court opinions that have defined the parameters of permissible warrantless searches and seizures. Part III explores the circuit
court opinions that have developed a "securing of the premises"
exception. Part IV describes Chief Justice Burger's analysis in
Segura. Part V argues that the Chief Justice's holding is not supported by prior case law and unnecessarily erodes the privacy interest in the home. This Recent Development concludes by urging
the Court to adopt an analytical framework, based on the circuit
courts' "securing of the premises" exception, that more carefully
balances the public need for law enforcement against the privacy
interest in the home.
II.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS DEFINING REASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES

In 1969 the Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision Chimel v. California,"' which significantly narrowed the scope
of permissible warrantless searches and seizures incident to an arrest on the private premises. Prior to Chimel lower courts generally had interpreted two Supreme Court opinions, Harris v. United
5 as allowing a thorough
States12 and United States v. Rabinowitz,"
search of the private premises incident to a lawful arrest on the
10. Id. at 3386-90. This finding does not constitute the holding of the opinion. The
holding appeared in Part V, in which the majority relied on an independent source analysis
to admit the evidence found pursuant to the subsequently issued valid search warrant. The
independent source doctrine allows the admission of evidence, notwithstanding a prior ilegality, when the link between the illegality and that evidence is sufficiently attenuated to
dissipate the taint. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
The majority concluded that the illegal entry into petitioners' apartment did not contribute
in any way to the discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant; therefore, the exclusionary rule did not demand the suppression of the postwarrant evidence. 104 S. Ct. at 3392.
11. 395 U.S. 752, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
12. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, reh'g denied,
396 U.S. 869 (1969).
13. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, reh'g denied,
396 U.S. 869 (1969).
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premises. 14 The lower court in Chimel had relied on the HarrisRabinowitz rule to allow the search of the arrestee's entire three
bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop.' 5 The Supreme Court found that this extensive invasion of
the arrestee's right to privacy in his home required the interposition of a neutral magistrate. 6 The Court thus explicitly overruled
Harris and Rabinowitz.7 and held that police can search only the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control."' 8
The Court offered two principal justifications for allowing this limited search: to prevent the arrestee from grabbing a nearby
weapon, which would threaten the safety of the arresting officers,
and to prevent the destruction of any evidence within the reach of
the arrestee. 19 By narrowing the scope of permissible searches incident to arrest from a search of the entire premises to a search of
the arrestee and the area within his control, Chimel recognized
that certain exigencies-the threatened destruction of evidence
and the danger of nearby weapons-justified limited intrusions on
a person's privacy interest in the home. The obvious next question
became whether any other exigencies would justify further intrusions. A year later, in Vale v. Louisiana, ° the Court gave a partial
answer by negative implication.
The Vale Court recognized that one exigency which would justify a warrantless search exists when evidence is in the process of
14. In Harris,331 U.S. 145 (1947), police had a warrant for defendant's arrest based
upon his alleged involvement in the cashing and interstate transportation of a forged check.
Police arrested defendant in the living room of his four bedroom apartment. Police conducted a warrantless search of his entire apartment looking for two cancelled checks. This
search uncovered evidence of totally unrelated crimes, and police used this evidence to convict defendant. The Harris majority found the search permissible because it was "incident
to arrest." Id. at 151.
In Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), police obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest
based on an allegation that he had been dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints. After
arresting defendant at his one-room business office, police searched his desk, safe, and file
cabinets. Police seized 573 stamps during the hour and a half search. Id. at 59. The Court
upheld "[t]he right. . . to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and
seize things connected with the crime." Id. at 61 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 30 (1925)).
For lower court cases relying on the Harris-Rabinowitz rule to justify a search of the
entire premises incident to arrest, see Townsend v. United States, 253 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.
1958); Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
15. Chimel, 95 U.S. at 760.
16. See id. at 761-62.
17. Id. at 768.
18. Id. at 763.
19. See id.
20. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
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being destroyed. In Vale police observing defendant's house saw
what they had probable cause to believe was a narcotics transaction. The police officers arrested defendant in his front yard, entered his house, and made a cursory sweep of the premises. A few
minutes later, when defendant's mother and brother returned, police conducted a warrantless search of the entire premises, presumably because they believed that the mother and brother would destroy evidence before police could return with a search warrant.2 1
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that the
easy destructibility of narcotics justified the warrantless search
and held that the search was impermissible.2 2 The Court, however,
noted that if the goods had been in the process of destruction,this
exigency would have justified the search. 23 The Vale opinion thus
implies that evidence in the process of destruction justifies the immediate search of a premises, whereas evidence merely threatened
with the possibility of destruction cannot justify this significant intrusion. Vale, however, left undecided whether police may secure
the premises to prevent the destruction of evidence while police
obtain a search warrant.2 4
21. Id. at 32-33.
22. Id. at 34.
23. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The Court concluded with the unexplained suggestion
that the officers should have obtained a search warrant prior to arresting defendant. Id.
Justice Black, dissenting, strongly criticized the majority's reasoning. Justice Black first
pointed out that police had probable cause to search defendant's house for drugs only upon
observing the alleged drug transaction outside defendant's house. Police officers, therefore,
could not have obtained a search warrant prior to their arrival at defendant's house. Id. at
40 (Black, J., dissenting). Black also contended that once defendant's mother and brother
arrived, police officers had sufficient exigencies to search the premises based on the
threatened destruction of evidence. Id. at 38-39 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
24. Several commentators have addressed this aspect of the Vale opinion. Professor
LaFave criticized the Court for its failure to clarify this issue by delineating the reasons for
not allowing the subsequent search. See 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.5, at 434-35 (1978). Two other commentators, Professor Kelder
and Mr. Statman, would limit Vale's "process of destruction" standard to the issue of the
validity of the warrantless search. They read Vale as allowing police to secure the premises,
but not to conduct a search to prevent the destruction of evidence before a warrant could be
obtained. See Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recurrent Questions Regarding the Propriety of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously with an Arrest on or
near Private Premises, 30 SYRAcusE L. REV. 973, 997-99 (1979). These two commentators
rely in part on this analysis of Vale to support their proposition that the Court has delineated a constitutional preference for securing the premises to prevent the destruction of evidence. See id. at 999-1003; see also Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction
of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1465, 1468 (1971) (asserting that Vale apparently
means that no exception to the warrant requirement justifies a warrantless search when
evidence is merely threatened with destruction and not yet in the process of destruction).
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Other than Vale, the Supreme Court has left only a scattering
of dicta to guide the police and lower courts in determining
whether the process or threat of destroying evidence justifies
searches or seizures in the home beyond the area of "control" defined in Chimel. In three older cases, Johnson v. United States,5
United States v. Jeffers,2 6 and Chapman v. United States,7 the
Supreme Court held entries into and searches of private premises
without a warrant unconstitutional. 2 The Court found no exigencies justifying the warrantless searches in these cases, specifically
noting that evidence was not threatened with removal or destruction.29 Some lower courts have relied upon this dicta to hold that
the threatened destruction of evidence is one exigency justifying an
immediate search of the premises.3 0
1 the Supreme Court
More recently, in Mincey v. Arizona,"
again provided some dicta defining the limits of warrantless
25. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
26. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
27. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
28. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), a confidential informer told police
officers that unidentified people were smoking opium at a certain hotel. Police investigating
the tip at the hotel smelled narcotics in the hallway. After locating the source of the smell,
police knocked on the door, entered the room, and arrested defendant. They then conducted
a warrantless search of the room and found opium.
In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), a narcotics agent and a hotel detective,
knowing defendant was absent, used a hotel passkey to enter defendant's room. Police then
conducted a detailed, warrantless search of the room and seized narcotics found inside a
pasteboard box.
In Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), defendant's landlord summoned
police to defendant's residence after the landlord detected the odor of whiskey mash. Police
entered the premises without a warrant in defendant's absence and arrested him when he
returned. Federal officials then arrived and, without a warrant, took custody of defendant,
seized samples of the mash, and destroyed the still.
29. Chapman, 365 U.S. at 615 ("No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction . . ... " (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948));
Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 52 ("There was no question of violence, no movable vehicle was involved, nor was there an arrest or imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the
property intended to be seized.").
30. See, e.g., United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973). These courts, however,
probably interpret the Supreme Court's dicta too broadly. Each of these cases concerned
both an illegal entry and an illegal search. The Supreme Court did not clearly indicate that
the threatened destruction of evidence would justify the warrantless search. Indeed, commentators have argued that the Court meant only that the threatened destruction of evidence justifies a warrantless entry but not a warrantless search. See Kelder & Statman,
supra note 24, at 993-96. See generally Comment, Warrantless Residential Searches to
Prevent the Destructionof Evidence: A Need for Strict Standards, 70 J. Cram L. & CnmMINOLOGY

31.

255 (1979).
437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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searches and seizures of private premises. Mincey concerned the
constitutionality of a four day warrantless search of defendant's
apartment after a shoot-out that resulted in the death of one police officer. In refusing to find this search reasonable, the Supreme
Court rejected the government's argument that defendant had a
lessened right to privacy in his home because he shot an officer on
the premises or because he was under arrest and was not present
during the search.3 2 The Court, however, noted that a limited warrantless search of the area to check for victims or to find the killer
would have been permissible.3 The Mincey opinion concluded that
a complete search would have been justified only upon proof that
"evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant."3 The Court added that the
presence of a police guard at the apartment minimized any danger
that evidence would be lost before police could obtain a search
warrant.33 Mincey thus suggests that the proper procedure for
preventing the destruction of evidence is not to search the premises but to secure the premises while police obtain a search
warrant.3 6
Prior to Segura v. United States the Supreme Court did not
decide any additional cases that clarify what exigencies justify the
securing of the premises. The Court has, however, addressed the
issue of permissible seizures in the contexts of cars, 7 footlockers, 35
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 394.

35. Id.
36. See Kelder & Statman, supra note 24, at 1002. The New York Court of Appeals
has interpreted Mincey as allowing the securing of the premises from the inside to protect
the scene of a crime even absent a showing that evidence was threatened with destruction.
People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27, 36-37, 444 N.E.2d 13, 18-19, 457 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768-69
(1982); see Note, A Novel Approach To WarrantlessSeizures of the Home: Inspirationalor
AberrationalLaw?, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv.231, 246-48 (1984).
In another search and seizure case, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), police
officers entered the private premises with an arrest warrant, but found arrestee was not
present. The officers then smelled marijuana and saw marijuana seeds on the table. The
police secured the premises and told the occupants that they could not leave unless they
consented to a bodily search. The Supreme Court did not hold that this detention was Megal, but assumed it was illegal for the purpose of determining whether a subsequent oral
confession was fruit of the illegal detention. Because the Court held the admission admissible, the Court did not address the legitimacy of the seizure. Apparently, the lower court had
not squarely addressed the issue of whether the seizure was legal. Id. at 106.
37. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
38. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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and luggage. 39 In Carroll v. United States0 the Supreme Court
held that the inherent mobility of a car provides sufficient exigencies to conduct an immediate warrantless search if police have
probable cause. 41 In Chambers v. Maroney42 the Court further asserted that the probable cause and inherent mobility of a car
which would justify a warrantless search at a roadside stop continue to justify a warrantless search of a car at the stationhouse
after its impoundment. The Chambers case raised the issue of
whether a search or a seizure constitutes a greater intrusion of privacy. 43 The Court, however, could not determine which intrusion
was greater in the case of a car and allowed the search at the stationhouse because the search was no more intrusive than the impoundment that had already occurred.4 4 The Court, however,
noted that the same analysis "may not follow where there is un' '4
foreseeable cause to search a house. 5
In United States v. Chadwick46 the Court again faced the issue of whether a warrantless search or a warrantless seizure constitutes the greater intrusion. In this case the Court allowed the
seizure of a footlocker,4 7 but held the immediate warrantless search
unconstitutional. The Court distinguished the case from Chambers
by noting that the principal privacy interest in a footlocker is not
in its exterior, but in its contents. Thus, although the impoundment constituted a "substantial infringement of respondents' use
and possession, the seizure did not diminish respondents' legiti39. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979). See generally Grano, Rethinking the FourthAmendment Warrant Requirement, 19
AM. CraM. L. REv. 603 (1982).
40. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
41. Id. The Supreme Court recently held that the mobility of a mobile home, combined with the owner's lower expectation of privacy because of the regulation of mobile
homes, justified a warrantless search when the police had probable cause to believe the mobile home contained contraband. See California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
42. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
43. Id. at 51-52 (stating that whether the search or seizure is the greater intrusion is a
debatable question whose answer depends on a variety of circumstances).
44. Id. at 52 ("We see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant.").
45. Id.
46. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
47. In Chadwick federal officials using a trained dog detected the presence of a controlled substance in a footlocker while it was being unloaded at a train station. The agents
did not seize the property immediately but waited until defendant picked up the footlocker

and placed it in the trunk of his car. The officers then arrested defendant and his companions, removed the footlocker from the car, and searched the footlocker. Id. at 4.
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mate expectation that the footlocker's contents would remain private. '43 This dicta illustrates the distinction drawn between
49
searches and seizures of effects: Except in the context of cars,
seizures constitute a lesser intrusion on an individual's privacy interest than do searches. Therefore, when a seizure can effectively
prevent the removal or loss of evidence until police can obtain a
search warrant, 50 police cannot commit the more significant intrusion of searching the effect seized. 5 1
Having begun to articulate a distinction between searches and
seizures, the Court attempted to refine its standard for the permissible scope of the seizure of a personal effect in United States v.
Place.2 In Place defendant had relinquished his luggage to drug
enforcement agents in an airport after they told him they were going to seek a warrant to search his luggage.53 The police did not
have probable cause to search the luggage, however, until ninety
minutes later when a trained canine detected the presence of narcotics in the luggage. The Court held that this ninety minute
seizure based on less than probable cause was unreasonable under
the fourth amendment.5 4 The Court asserted that the duration of
48. Id. at 13 n.8; see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (applying the
Chadwick analysis to a suitcase located in an automobile and stating: "Where. . . the police, without endangering themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have detained
one suspected of criminal activity and secured his suitcase, they should delay the search
thereof until after judicial approval has been obtained.").
49. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Supreme Court extended the
automobile exception to the search warrant requirement to include containers found when
searching the car. Thus, if police have probable cause to search a car for contraband, and
they find a container that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband, then
Ross allows police to search that container. Chadwick and Sanders, supra note 48, also
involved containers in automobiles, but the Ross court distinguished these two cases by
noting that in Chadwick and Sanders police had probable cause to search only those specific
containers and not the entire car. Id. at 809-14.
50. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 (noting that placing the footlocker under police control eliminated any danger of losing evidence before a warrant could be obtained).
51. At least two commentators have relied upon the Supreme Court's Chadwick analysis to conclude that the search of a house is never justified when an impoundment will
prevent the loss of evidence. See Kelder & Statman, supra note 24, at 1003.
52. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
53. The police told defendant that he was free to accompany them. He declined, but
obtained from the agents telephone numbers at which he could reach them. Id. at 699.
54. Id. at 710. The Court reasoned that the seizure must fit within either the exceptions for seizures of property based on probable cause or the exceptions for Terry-type
seizures based on less than probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry
concerned the forcible stop and frisk of an individual on a public street. The Terry majority
implicitly adopted the standard that an officer's forcible stop of a suspect is reasonable if
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. See id.
at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (hold-
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the interference can transform a seizure that is reasonable at its
inception into one that is unreasonable. In arriving at the holding
the Court again noted that a seizure is distinct from a search: a
seizure interferes only with a person's possessory interest as opposed to his privacy interest.5 5 Prior to Segura the Supreme Court
did not attempt to analyze the permissible scope of a seizure, as
distinct from a search, in the context of the home.
III.

THE CIRCUIT COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

SECURING OF THE PREMISES EXCEPTION

Although the Supreme Court has had only limited opportunity
to consider when police may "seize" the premises without unreasonably intruding upon fourth amendment protections, many of
the circuits have discussed the constitutional implications of this
impoundment process. Thus, aided by little Supreme Court dicta,
the circuit courts have developed the constitutional parameters of
the "securing of the premises" exception. In developing the securing of the premises exception, courts have addressed two distinct
issues. First, when does the fourth amendment permit a warrantless entry? Second, once the police have entered the premises,
what steps may the police take to secure the premises?
A.

The Warrantless Entry

The most significant constitutional barrier to invoking the securing of the premises exception is the warrantless entry into the
premises. In United States v. McLaughlin" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that if officers have
probable cause to believe evidence is on the premises, and if delaying entry involves a substantial risk that evidence will be removed
or destroyed, then the fourth amendment permits a warrantless
ing that Terry allowed the limited detention of persons while authorities searched premises
pursuant to a valid search warrant); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)

(brief investigative stop near border justified by reasonable suspicion that car contained
aliens); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (allowing officer making a reasonable investigatory stop to conduct a limited protective search for weapons when he had reason to
believe the suspect was armed and dangerous).

The Place court relied on Terry and its progeny to conclude that an officer who has a
reasonable suspicion that a traveller is carrying luggage containing narcotics may detain the
luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicions. 462 U.S. at 709
(emphasis added). See generally Note, Seizures of PersonalProperty Supported by Reasonable Suspicion: United States v. Place, 44 LA. L. REV. 1149 (1984).
55. 462 U.S. at 708.
56. 525 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976).
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entry and securing of the premises. 57 Most circuit courts considering the issue presented in McLaughlin have accepted a standard
for legitimate entry that is similar to this standard articulated by
the Ninth Circuit.5 s These courts have upheld warrantless entries
only in situations involving a substantial risk of evidence being destroyed or removed. At least one circuit, however, has demonstrated a rather deferential approach to reviewing a district court's
approval of a warrantless entry and securing of the premises.5 9 In
United States v. Korman 0 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit approved a lower court's finding of exigent circumstances based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the entry.
In Korman an FBI agent saw defendant pick up a suitcase
from a smuggler who was cooperating with the government. 6 The
agents tracked defendant and the suitcase to his residence. A few
minutes after the agents arrived, they saw defendant hurriedly
leave his house and drive away. The agents arrested defendant almost a quarter of a mile from the residence. When the officers discovered that the suitcase was not in the car, they entered and secured defendant's house in which only his wife and children were
57. 525 F.2d at 520. In McLaughlin police officers had the premises under surveillance. After arresting one person outside, the officers entered the premises for the purpose
of arresting the occupants and preventing the destruction of evidence. The Ninth Circuit
considered the argument that officers should continue their surveillance, interceptions, and
arrests of suspects outside the premises until a search warrant arrives. The McLaughlin
court rejected this argument, however, reasoning that such a seige would have risked the
destruction of evidence and endangered innocent people in the neighborhood. See id. at 521;
see also United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1051 (1977) (following McLaughlin and holding that agents who had observed the arrival of
a package they knew contained heroin were justified in entering and securing the premises
"to the extent necessary to prevent the destruction of the evidence until a warrant could be
obtained").
58. See, e.g., United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 336 n.18 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d
458, 468-69 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
59. See United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1980).
The Sixth Circuit's deferential attitude is illustrated by its quotation of the lower court:
It is also to be noted in this regard that the case law is clear that the agents, in reaching a decision of the nature that they did here, need only have sufficient information to
justify the warrantless entry to reasonably conclude that evidence would be destroyed
or removed. A hindsight, Monday-morning quarterback position, which might show
that in fact that was not about to happen, is not the standard by which their conduct is
to be judged, but rather the situation as it appeared to them at the time.
Id. at 545.
60. Id. at 541.
61. Id. at 548 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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62 The
present.
Sixth Circuit held the entry and securing of the
premises reasonable.6 3 The dissent 64 argued that the exigency standard requires a high probability rather than a mere possibility that
evidence will be destroyed.6 5 The dissent feared that the majority's
deferential approach to examining the constitutionality of a warrantless entry implies that when police face the mere possibility
that occupants threaten evidence with destruction, police may
enter and secure the premises.6
Another factor in determining the reasonableness of a warrantless entry may be the reasonableness of the delay prior to entry. For example, danger to the public posed by undiscovered dynamite created sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the
warrantless entry and securing of defendant's apartment in United
6 7 In reaching
States v. Picariello
this holding, however, the United

62. Id. The agents testified that the presence of another car which they had earlier
observed following defendant justified their fear that the evidence was threatened with destruction. The agents thought that the other car was engaged in "counter-surveillance."
They also testified that the presence of three cars in the driveway indicated that other people were present. The agents argued that this inference coupled with the counter-surveillance, the hurried departure by defendant, and the lateness of the hour justified their conclusion that sufficient exigent circumstances existed to enter and secure the premises. Id. at
549-50 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 547. This holding, however, did not restrain the court from examining other
alleged constitutional violations "irrespective of the legality of the initial entry." This examination suggests that the Sixth Circuit had doubts about the legitimacy of the search.
64. Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
65. In reflecting on the legality of the warrantless entry, the dissent first noted that
the Supreme Court has never recognized a "securing-the-premises-in-anticipation-of-asearch-warrant" exception to the warrant requirement because such "an exception would
swallow the rule" and destroy the protection the search warrant requirement seeks to provide. Id. at 549 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement applies only to a true emergency, such as when evidence is "in the process of destruction." Id. at 550 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (quoting Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970)). The dissent found that no such emergency existed in this
case. The agents had no reason to believe that the occupants were aware of defendant's
arrest. Thus, only a possibility existed that the evidence would be destroyed. Id. at 550-52
(Merritt, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 550 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
67. 568 F.2d 222 (lst Cir. 1978). The securing of the premises took place as part of an
investigation of stolen dynamite and bombings. In the early morning before the entry, the
police, after engaging in a high speed chase, had lost defendants tailing them from Maine to
Massachusetts. The police later found defendants' car unattended and wired with dynamite.
The agents involved in this chase notified other agents in Portland, Maine-the site of defendants' apartment. Agents in Portland began assembling information at 7:00 a.m. in preparation for seeking a search warrant. At 11:00 a.m. the agents decided to secure the apartment pending issuance of the search warrant, which the agents ultimately obtained at 2:40
p.m. Id. at 224-25. The Picariello court found that the unrecovered dynamite and the unknown whereabouts of defendant created a "volatile" situation that posed a real threat to
the public and thus justified the entry and securing of the premises. Id. at 226.
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered difficult
questions concerning the delay prior to entry. Defendant argued
that the seven hour delay between the time officers had probable
cause to search and the time of the warrantless entry eliminated
the exigent circumstances exception; the delay suggested that the
officers had reasonable time to seek a warrant.68 The First Circuit
9 the seven hour delay was
held that, given the facts of Picarielo,"
not unreasonable and thus the exigent circumstances exception
justified the warrantless entry and securing of the premises. 0
The availability of "telephone search warrants 7 1 has added a
new dimension to the determination of reasonable delay. Recently,
in United States v. Cuaron,2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit considered a claim by defendant that exigent
circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry and securing of
his private residence because police had time to obtain a federal
telephone search warrant.73 The district court had found that exigencies supported the warrantless entry, but had failed to consider
the telephone search warrant option.74 The Tenth Circuit held that
68. Id.
69. On the morning of the July 4 holiday, agents were called at their homes and told
to come down to the station to help prepare affidavits. The other agents involved in the
investigation had not yet had time to return from chasing defendant into Massachusetts.
See supra note 67. Agents preparing affidavits had to compile, sift, and put data in satisfactory order. Picariello,568 F.2d at 226.
70. In reaching the conclusion that the delay was not unreasonable, the First Circuit
considered the Supreme Court opinion in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338
(1977). In G.M. Leasing the Court held that the agents' delay, for two days following a
warrantless entry into defendant's office and for one day following the observation that material was being removed from the office, eliminated any exigent circumstance exception. Id.
at 226.
71. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize magistrates to issue search
warrants based on sworn testimony over the telephone. FED. R. CRI. P. 41(c)(2). As of 1985
12 states have enacted provisions authorizing oral search warrants. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.35.015 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3914(c) (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526(b)
(West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-202 (1983); Nav. RE v. STAT. § 179.045 (1981); N.Y.
CraM. PROc. LAW § 690.36 (McKinney 1984); NJ). R CRIm P. 41(c)(92); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit.
22, §§ 1223.1, 1225(B) (West Supp. 1984); O&REv. STAT. §§ 133.545(4), 133.555(3) (1973);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-4 (1982); Wis. STAT. § 968.12(3) (1985); see also V.L CODE ANN. tit.
5, § 3901 (1967) (incorporating Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
72. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
73. Id. at 586. Cuaron concerned an undercover drug operation in which federal agents
had followed a drug dealer to defendant's house. Agents arrested the dealer after he left
defendant's home. The agents feared that within thirty minutes after the dealer's arrest,
defendant would become suspicious. The agents knew that defendant expected the dealer to
pick up more cocaine. The agents, therefore, decided to enter and secure the premises. Id. at
586-87.
74. Id. at 588.
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trial courts must consider the availability of a telephone warrant in
determining the existence of exigent circumstances. 5 Exigent circumstances, therefore, exist only when the critical nature of the
76
circumstances prevents the use of any warrant procedure.
B.

Securing the Premises

After police have made a warrantless entry, the question becomes what steps police may take to secure the premises." In
United States v. Cuarons police officers entering defendant's
house saw an upstairs bedroom door close. Suspecting that someone was attempting to destroy evidence, an officer went into the
closed bedroom and stopped defendant from flushing drugs down
the toilet.7 9 The Cuaron court found the officer's action "reasonably necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence"8 0 and held
75. Id. at 589. The Tenth Circuit noted that the legislative history of Rule 41(c)(2)
suggests that Congress intended "to encourage police to procure telephone warrants where
'the existence of exigent circumstances is a close question and the police might otherwise
conduct a warrantless search."' Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d
1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also FED.R. CR. P. 41(c)(2), Notes of Advisory Committee
on Rules-1977 Amendment, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. 640, 640 (1982).
76. Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 589. The Cuaron court examined a district court opinion,
United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D. Iowa 1981), in which the court found that
agents had an hour and fifteen minutes between the time they had probable cause and the
time the occupants might have begun to destroy evidence. 700 F.2d at 589. The Baker court
held that an hour and fifteen minutes was "abundant time" in which to seek a federal telephone warrant. 520 F. Supp. at 1083-84. After examining the facts of Cuaron, however, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the agents did not have even thirty minutes to obtain a warrant before the occupants of the house might have become suspicious and begun to destroy
evidence. The court thus found that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry
into defendant's house. 700 F.2d at 590; see also United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding the 20 to 30 minutes between the time agents tailing defendant
suspected his destination to be his home and the time defendant might reasonably be expected to begin destroying evidence insufficient time to procure a telephone warrant). See
generally Marek, Telephonic Search Warrants: A New Equation for Exigent Circumstances, 27 CLaV. ST. L. REv. 35 (1978).
77. "Securing the premises" may be either a search or a seizure, depending on the
circumstances.
78. 700 F.2d at 582.
79. Id. at 591.
80. Id. The court emphasized that the officers limited their actions inside the house to
steps necessary to maintain the status quo. Id. For additional cases in which courts have
noted that warrantless searches will be upheld when they are narrowly tailored to fit the
existing exigencies, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("But a warrantless
search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.'" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)); United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 521
(9th Cir. 1975) ("[E]xigent circumstances justify an entry to arrest and to secure the premises to the extent necessary to prevent the destruction or removal of the evidence. They,
however, carry the officers no further.").
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permissible the seizure of items in plain view."'
In United States v. Agapitos2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the issue whether police
may make a protective sweep of the premises to check for people.
The Second Circuit found that once police are lawfully on the
premises, the security check constitutes only a slight additional intrusion because the search is cursory in nature and designed to detect people not things.8 3 After weighing the public interest in protecting police officers and preserving evidence against the modest
intrusion on individual privacy, the court concluded that a security
check meets the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment."' The Second Circuit, however, noted that once police have
secured the premises, no further search is permissible until the
85
warrant arrives.
81. 700 F.2d at 591. The Supreme Court has enunciated a "plain view" doctrine that
allows an officer who is lawfully present within the premises to seize items that he discovers
inadvertently. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 326
(1980).
82. 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 336 (citing United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977),
which held a security check proper when police made arrest outside and reasonably believed
people were inside).
84. Id. The Agapito court discussed an earlier Second Circuit decision, United States
v. Dien, 615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), on reh'g from 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the
court had held a security check unreasonable absent any belief that other people were in
defendant's one room studio apartment. Dien, 609 F.2d at 1047. The Agapito court stated
that the Dien court held the security check unreasonable because the court found the security check was a mere pretext to justify a warrantless search. The officers in Dien conducted
the security check not to protect themselves upon entry, but after detecting the odor of
marijuana. Agapito, 620 F.2d at 335 n.15. Nonetheless, the Agapito court clearly allows a
security check, even absent any reasonable belief that other people are present, provided
that police conduct the security check as part of the securing of the premises process. Id. at
335-36.
Commentators have argued that whenever the police have probable cause to search a
premises and are going to impound the premises in anticipation of a search warrant, the
danger posed to police officers remaining on or near the premises justifies a protective sweep
regardless of whether the police officers reasonably believe that other persons are present.
See Kelder & Statman, supra note 24, at 1023; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
589 (1980) (noting in dicta that in executing an arrest warrant "the police may need to
check the entire premises for safety reasons"); United States v. Christophe, 470 F.2d 865,
869 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that in securing the premises officers are entitled to make a
cursory examination of the premises for the presence of anyone who might threaten officers'
safety or destroy evidence). But see United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.)
(stating that police probably should not have made a protective sweep of the premises incident to arrest of defendant and as part of securing the premises), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1051 (1976); United States v. Bravo, 403 F. Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding unconstitutional a protective sweep of the premises absent any reasonable belief that others who posed
a threat to police officer safety were present).
85. 620 F.2d at 337.
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Difficult questions remain concerning what steps police may
take to prevent the destruction of evidence after they have entered
the premises and made a security check. In United States v.
DiGregorioe the First Circuit held that when police officers legitimately on the premises have probable cause to believe that evidence is located on the premises, the likelihood that occupants will
remove or destroy evidence before a search warrant arrives justifies
police presence to watch the occupants.8 7 FBI agents in DiGregorio
secured the premises by informing the occupants that they were
free to leave but that they could not remove any evidence pending
the issuance of a search warrant.8 8 Similarly, in United States v.
Diaz89 the Second Circuit held that police officers legitimately on
the premises were not required to leave immediately because of the
serious risk that an occupant would remove or destroy evidence
before a search warrant arrived 0 In Diaz the court specifically
noted that because police had no probable cause to arrest defendant's wife or children, the only practical means of preserving the
evidence was for police to watch the remaining occupants.9 1
In cases in which police have probable cause to search the
premises, but have no reasonable belief that anyone who might destroy evidence is present, the Sixth Circuit suggested in United
86. 605 F.2d 1184 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979).
87. Id. at 1188. In DiGregorio an FBI investigation of a shooting and other acts of
extortion resulted in the conviction of defendant for conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce. The securing of the premises occurred after FBI agents entered defendant's premises
with the consent of his wife and discovered the four defendants sitting around a kitchen
table with a shotgun in plain view. Presumably, police had probable cause to search the
premise only after seeing the gun. Id. at 1186-87.
88. Id. at 1187. The police remained on the premises for eight hours. The court did
not discuss the reasonableness of the duration of the detention.
89. 577 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1978).
90. Id. at 824. Police entered the premises with probable cause to arrest defendant,
but without an arrest warrant. The court did not discuss on what grounds the entry was
legal. The court noted that the police first attempted to gain peaceful access by giving notice
of their authority and purpose, but after hearing the flushing of the toilet, broke the door
down. Id. at 822-23. These facts suggest the lower court may have found that exigent circumstances justified the entry. This case, however, was decided before Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980), made it clear that the fourth amendment does not allow entry to arrest
without an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances.
91. Diaz, 577 F.2d at 824 n.3; see also United States v. Christophe, 470 F.2d 865 (2d
Cir. 1972) (allowing the securing of the premises when defendant's wife was present).
The Supreme Court in Vale v. Louisiana, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying
text, faced the dilemma of what steps police may take when occupants, whom the police
cannot arrest, pose a significant threat to the interest in preserving evidence. DiGregario
and Diaz may offer a solution to that problem by allowing seizures in fact situations similar
to that in which the Vale Court was not willing to allow a search.

1985]

SECURING OF THE PREMISES

1605

States v. Hayes92 that the proper method of protecting evidence is
to post a guard outside the premises until a search warrant arrivesY s Similarly, the Second Circuit held in Agapito that if a security check reveals that no one is present, police should leave and
station a policeman at the door."4 The Ninth Circuit, however, held
in United States v. Lomas9 5 that even guarding the premises from
the outside constitutes an illegal seizure absent exigent circumstances.9 6 Lomas clearly indicates that when considering the sanc92. 518 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1975). In Hayes agents had knowledge from surveillance and
from informants' tips of the identity of persons involved in a drug transaction. After arresting these people outside their hotel rooms, the agents entered the rooms without any reason
to suspect the presence of other co-conspirators who might threaten the security of the evidence or the agents' safety. The Hayes court noted that the mere possibility that someone
could have entered the hotel rooms and destroyed evidence was not enough to support a
finding of exigent need to enter the hotel room. Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
93. Id. (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951)). For a discussion of
Jeffers, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
94. Agapito, 620 F.2d at 337. The agents in Agapito remained on the empty premises
for almost 24 hours. See also United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the warrantless entry, but affirming the district
court's suppression of 13 items, which the court found to be the product of an impermissible
16 hour warrantless search of the premises).
95. 706 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984).
96. 706 F.2d at 893. The Lomas appeal resulted form a Drug Enforcement Administration investigation of a narcotics operation. An agent conducting surveillance at defendant's
hotel entered the room, made a cursory 30-second search of the premises, and then secured
the premises. The court found it legally insignificant that the officers waited outside rather
than inside for the warrant to arrive. Id. at 893-94. The lower court did not decide whether
exigent circumstances existed because the lower court found the agent's actions reasonable
without proof of exigencies. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit admitted the evidence found in
the room as cumulative without determining whether exigent circumstances justified the
1
seizure. Id. at 894.
The court may have found the police officer's action reasonable if he had only guarded
the premises from the outside, rather than entering to make a quick search. The language of
the opinion suggests, however, that the Ninth Circuit found the warrantless seizure as impermissible as the entry, absent exigent circumstances. The court stated: "The distinction
between searches and seizures in this instance is more than mere semantics. Our holding in
Allard II was not limited to warrantless entries, but directed also at police attempts to
maintain the status quo by exercising control over a place while seeking a search warrant."
706 F.2d at 893-94.
United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (Allard I), modified, 634 F.2d
1182 (9th Cir. 1980) (Allard I1), concerned appeals from a Drug Enforcement Administration investigation of a cocaine distribution operation. Two agents entered a hotel room and
questioned its occupant. The agents then called for a search warrant and remained on the
premises for two hours until the search warrant arrived. On the first appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that even though the officers had probable cause to search the premises, no exigent
circumstances justified the illegal entry. The case was thus remanded to the district court to
determine whether sufficient independent grounds existed for the subsequent search warrant to remove the taint of the illegal entry. See 600 F.2d at 1305 (citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). The district court determined that the subsequent
search warrant was not based on any unlawfully acquired evidence and denied defendant's

1606

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1589

tity of the home, the Ninth Circuit draws no constitutional distinctions between searches and seizures-both demand either a search
warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances. Chief Justice
7
Burger clearly rejected this premise in Segura v. United States.1
IV.
SECURING OF THE PREMISES FROM THE INSIDE FOUND
PERMISSIBLE ABSENT A SHOWING OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES:

Segura v. United States
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York held in United States v. Segura that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry into and occupation
of defendants' apartment.9 8 The district court suppressed all evidence found in defendants' apartment, including evidence found
pursuant to a subsequently obtained, valid search warrant.9 9 On
motion to suppress the evidence found pursuant to the search warrant. On appeal to a different panel, Allard II held that the "independent source" rule did not afford adequate
protection against illegal entries to secure the premises. See infra note 103 (defining the
"independent source rule"). Allard II thus adopted a stricter test: The government must
prove "that it would have both independently discovered and successfully obtained the
proffered evidence notwithstanding the illegal seizure." 634 F.2d at 1187. Allard II found
that the government failed to meet this stricter test and suppressed the evidence as fruit of
the illegal entry. Prior to the Supreme Court's consideration of this issue in Segura, the
Ninth Circuit was the only circuit to apply the stricter test. The other circuits simply applied an independent source analysis. See United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1981), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984); United States v. Beck, 662 F.2d 527, 529-30 (8th Cir.
1981); United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952
(1980); United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1042 (1st Cir. 1980).
97. 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3386 (1984) (Burger, C.J., writing for majority but joined in Part
IV of the opinion only by O'Connor, J.).
98. 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981). The events surrounding the instant appeal were the
culmination of a two week investigation of defendants Segura and Colon by the New York
Drug Enforcement Task Force. When the Task Force agents determined that they had
probable cause to arrest defendants, the agents contacted the United States Attorney's Office and requested permission to arrest defendants and authorization to search their apartment. The Assistant United States Attorney authorized the arrests but stated that because
it was already 6:30 p.m., a search warrant was unobtainable. He therefore advised them to
arrest defendants and "secure the premises" pending the issuance of a warrant. The agents
went to defendants' apartment and climbed the fire escape where they could see anyone
entering or leaving the apartment. The agents neither saw nor heard anything that led them
to believe anyone was home. After a few hours, the officers left the fire escape and went
outside the building to await Segura's arrival. Segura arrived and the agents arrested him as
he entered the building lobby. They forcibly took Segura to his third floor apartment and
knocked on the door. Colon answered and the officers entered without permission. They
found three other people with Colon and arrested all four occupants. When the agents made
a protective sweep of the apartment, they found narcotics paraphernalia in plain view. The
agents remained in the now empty apartment for 18 to 20 hours until a search warrant
arrived. Id. at 413.
99. Id. at 412.
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appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the finding of no exigent circumstances and suppressed the evidence found in plain view. 10 0
The Second Circuit, however, admitted the evidence discovered after the issuance of the search warrant. 10 On remand, the district
court convicted defendants on the basis of this evidence and the
Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. 0 2 Defendants appealed the
admission of the postwarrant evidence, asserting that the conduct
of police officers in remaining inside the premises for eighteen to
twenty hours until the search warrant arrived constituted an unreasonable seizure of all the items within the apartment. 0 3 Chief
Justice Burger, in the portion of the majority opinion joined only
by Justice O'Connor, 0 4 found that the seizure did not violate the
100. Id. at 415, 417. The Second Circuit determined that the agents' surveillence did
not give rise to any reasonable belief that anyone was present within defendants' apartment.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if the police thought someone was inside, they
had no reason to believe that the people inside knew of defendant's arrest. Therefore, the
evidence was not threatened with immediate destruction or loss. The Second Circuit also
declined to find that the knocking at the apartment door gave rise to exigent circumstances
that justified the entry. The court stated that to allow such an exception would permit
agents "to create their own exigencies." Id. at 415 (quoting United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d
1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980)). The Second Circuit thus concluded that the exclusionary rule
demanded the suppression of the evidence found in plain view after the warrantless entry.
The court stated: "Given the potential for abuse of the emergency security check exception
by officers who would create their own emergencies, we believe it appropriate 'to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing
the incentive to disregard it.'" Id. at 417 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600
(1975)).
101. 663 F.2d at 417.
102. Segura, 104 S. Ct. at 3380.
103. Id. at 3386. Defendants advanced this argument to avoid the independent source
exception to the warrant requirement. Under the independent source exception, the court
admits the evidence if the government can prove that the subsequent search pursuant to a
valid search warrant was based on information sufficiently unrelated to the constitutional
violation to dissipate the taint of illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
488 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Thus, defendants contended that because all the apartment's contents were "seized" at the time of the
illegal entry and occupation, the postwarrant evidence must be suppressed because it was a
direct result of that primary illegality. 104 S. Ct. at 3386.
104. Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Rehnquist joined the Chief Justice in the
majority opinion, but only Justice O'Connor joined Chief Justice Burger on Part IV of the
opinion. Part IV concerns the reasonableness of the occupation. Presumably, the other Justices found deciding this issue inappropriate and unnecessary because the Government had
expressly conceded the unreasonableness of the occupation, and the Court's subsequent independent source analysis held the evidence admissible regardless of whether the occupation was reasonable. See 104 S. Ct. at 3395 n.9. (stating that at oral argument the Government conceded that the agents' occupation of the apartment constituted a "continuing
search"); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 3583, 3584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(mem.) (noting the astonishing judicial activism represented by Chief Justice Burger's finding in Segura that the occupation was reasonable in spite of the Government's expressed
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fourth amendment.
The Chief Justice began by stating that the fourth amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 10 5 He
then recognized the distinction between searches and seizures, noting that Chadwick'0 6 and Sanders °7 found warrantless seizures of
property reasonable even though the warrantless searches were unreasonable.10 8 After examining the facts of these two opinions, the
Chief Justice stated that the Court's approval of the seizure was
not based on a concern that the evidence was threatened with immediate loss or destruction. 10 9 He thus reasoned that underlying
these decisions is a belief that society's interest in protecting incriminating evidence can outweigh, for a limited period of time, a
person's possessory interest in the property seized, provided that
police have probable cause to believe that the property is associated with criminal activity." 0
The Chief Justice next found that Mincey v. Arizona"' and
Rawlings v. Kentucky" 2 suggest Court approval for the police
practice of securing the premises to maintain the status quo even
concession that the occupation was unreasonable).
105. 104 S. Ct. at 3386.
106. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). For a discussion of Chadwick, see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
107. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). For a discussion of Sanders, see supra note 48.
108. 104 S. Ct. at 3387.
109. Id. at 3388. Burger reasoned that in both Chadwick and Sanders officers could
have prevented the evidence from being lost or destroyed by following the cars in which the
property at issue was placed. Id.
110. Id.
111. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). For a discussion of Mincey v. Arizona, see supra notes 31-36
and accompanying text.
112. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In Rawlings, see supra note 36, police entered a house with an
arrest warrant for a resident of that house. While searching the house, the officers smelled
marijuana. Two of the officers went to obtain a search warrant while other officers remained
behind. The officers told the occupants of the house that they could leave only if they consented to a body search. After obtaining a search warrant for the house 45 minutes later, the
officers searched an occupant's purse which contained drugs that were controlled substances
under Kentucky law. The owner of the purse told defendant to take what was his from her
purse. Defendant then admitted that he owned the drugs. The two primary issues facing the
Court were: (1) whether defendant had standing to challenge the legality of the search of the
third person's purse, and (2) whether the statements of ownership made by defendant were
inadmissible as fruit of an illegal detention. The Court answered both issues in the negative
and thus affirmed defendant's conviction. In Segura the Chief Justice noted that although
officers secured the premises in Rawlings, the Court did not question the admissibility of
the evidence discovered pursuant to the subsequently issued warrant. 104 S. Ct. at 3388.
Although that contention may be true, the admissibility of that evidence was not an issue
before the Rawlings Court. Thus, Rawlings does not provide support for the Chief Justice's
seizure analysis in Segura.
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when evidence is not threatened with immediate destruction.
These opinions, along with the oft quoted line from Katz v. United
States"--"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places"-led the Chief Justice to conclude that the "home is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupants' possessory interests in the premises, but because of their
privacy interests in the activities that take place within."11 Chief
Justice Burger thus concluded that a seizure does not invoke the
higher constitutional protections afforded a search. Therefore, the
the
securing of a dwelling on the basis of probable cause to prevent
15
seizure.
unreasonable
an
not
is
evidence
of
destruction
Examining the facts of Segura, the Chief Justice distinguished
the warrantless entry from the warrantless seizure. He stated that
the Second Circuit may have been correct in treating the warrantless entry, which was unsupported by exigent circumstances, as an
unreasonable search requiring the suppression of evidence observed during entry.116 The Chief Justice, nevertheless, found that
once the initial entry was over, the internal seizure constituted no
greater interference with defendants' possessory interests in the
contents of the apartment than an external stakeout.1 7 Finally,

the Chief Justice noted that although a seizure that is reasonable
at its inception may become unreasonable because of its duration,
the eighteen to twenty hour delay in obtaining a search warrant
was not unreasonable in this case. 8
The dissent'" found the eighteen to twenty hour occupation
113. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
114. 104 S. Ct. at 3389 (emphasis in original).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Chief Justice dismissed defendants' argument that holding the seizure
reasonable would increase the possibility of illegal entries. Id. at 3390. The Chief Justice
rejected that argument for four reasons. First, the Chief Justice does not believe officers will
violate the law routinely and purposefully by engaging in warrantless entries unsupported
by exigent circumstances. Second, officers who have probable cause have no reason to enter
the premises prior to obtaining a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, which would allow
the entry. Third, the suppression of all evidence found in plain view during a warrantless
entry discourages officers from entering illegally. Last, officers entering a private premises
without a warrant and without exigent circumstances expose themselves to unnecessary and
unwanted civil liability. Id.
118. Id. In finding that the delay was not unreasonable the Chief Justice noted the
following considerations: The lateness of the hour made it difficult to obtain a warrant; the
officers were busy processing the five arrestees; and the actual interference with the defendants' possessory interest in their apartment was virtually nonexistent because the defendants were not there. Id.
119. Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Mar-
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unreasonable for two distinct reasons. First, the occupation
amounted to a warrantless "search" within the contemplation of
the fourth amendment. 120 The dissent reasoned that the agents' occupancy inevitably involved the scrutiny of personal effects
throughout the apartment. 12 1 The dissent thus found untenable
the Chief Justice's assumption that no constitutional distinction
exists between an external stakeout and an internal occupation.'22
Second, the dissent argued that the occupation was an unreasonable "seizure" within the contemplation of the fourth amendment.
The dissent contended that precedent virtually compelled the con23
clusion that the agents "seized" the contents of the apartment.
The dissent concluded that this seizure was unreasonable from its
inception because the agents acted without a warrant and in the
absence of exigent circumstances. 1 24 The dissent further argued
that even if the seizure had been reasonable at its inception, the
eighteen to twenty hour delay in obtaining a warrant certainly was
unreasonable. 25 The dissent thus concluded that the occupation of
defendants' apartment constituted a second violation of the fourth
amendment: "Not only was it the fruit of the initial illegal entry
into that apartment, but it also constituted an unreasonable search
shall, and Blackmun joined.
120. 104 S.Ct. at 3394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that both Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), reh'g denied,
396 U.S. 869 (1969), suggested that a person's expectations of privacy do not cease after the
initial entry. For a discussion of Mincey, see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of Chimel, see supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
121. 104 S.Ct. at 3395 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted in a footnote
the Government's admission that the agents' occupation of the apartment constituted a
"continuing search." Id. at 3395 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 3395 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. The dissent analogized the seizure of the apartment to cases holding that
when police take custody of an arrestee's person they concomitantly take custody of his
personal effects, see Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), and to cases holding that when police take custody of a car they
also take custody of its contents, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 104 S.
Ct. at 3395-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 3396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that since Chimel the
Court has held that police may neither search nor seize the contents of a home without a
warrant or exigent circumstances. Id. Justice Stevens, however, stated in a footnote that he
assumed that an impoundment of the premises from the outside, pending the issuance of a
warrant, would be permissible even absent exigent circumstances, provided police do not
enter the premises. Id. at 3396 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 3397 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the Government's
only excuse for the delay was the time necessary to process the arrestees. The dissent concluded that because the arrests were unconstitutional, the Chief Justice allowed the police
to use one wrong to justify another. Id. at 3397 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS

Criticisms of Segura

Segura represents an effort by at least two members of the
Court to recognize a "securing of the premises" exception to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. Given the conflict
between the circuits on the permissibility of seizures, 1 7 the Chief
Justice may have realized the need to articulate the fourth amendment implications of seizing the premises to maintain the status
quo. Unfortunately, Segura did not present the proper facts for
articulating such an exception. The Chief Justice's narrow reading
of the fourth amendment to find the Segura occupation reasonable
has two negative consequences: the Chief Justice's interpretation
limits the meaning of fourth amendment privacy and expands the
definition of reasonable time.
The facts of Segura constitute a clear violation of the principle enunciated in Payton v. New York: police must have an arrest
warrant to enter a defendant's home and arrest him. 128 In Segura
police arrested Colon and three other occupants inside a private
dwelling without a warrant. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice's analysis relies, in part, on these arrests to find the seizure reasonable.
Had the police not arrested Colon and the other occupants, then
the police officers' occupation of the premises easily would have
met the Chief Justice's new standard for an unreasonable intrusion
into the home. The police presence would have interfered with the
remaining occupants' "privacy interest in the activities that take
place within. '129 Thus, absent exigent circumstances, this occupation would not have been reasonable. The Chief Justice might argue that the presence of occupants would present exigent circumstances. Under these facts, however, the presence of occupants
presented exigent circumstances only when the police alerted the
occupants to the need to destroy evidence. Such an argument,
therefore, would impermissibly allow police officers to create their
own exigencies. 3 Therefore, when occupants are present and no
exigent circumstances exist, police can take advantage of this new
126. Id. at 3398 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
128. 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
129. See supra text accompanying note 114.
130. See supra note 100.
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constitutional mandate only by committing two constitutional violations: first, entering the premises illegally and second, arresting
the occupants illegally. To find a fourth amendment exception that
depends on fourth amendment violations is antithetical to the very
protections guaranteed by the Constitution.
Not only do the facts in Segura fall to justify an exception to
the warrant requirement, but the Chief Justice's reasoning is
faulty. Relying on the assertion in Katz v. United States'31 that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people not places,"'1 32 the Chief
Justice concluded that the primary focus of the fourth amendment
privacy interest is the occupants' activities in the home rather than
the property in the home. 13 3 The Chief Justice's premise, however,
34
is inaccurate; the fourth amendment protects people and places.1
Moreover, the Chief Justice relied on Katz, which extended fourth
amendment protection to places other than homes, 135 to restrict
fourth amendment protection in the home. This distorted application of Katz is unwarranted and inappropriate. Furthermore, if the
Chief Justice's definition is accurate, and if the fourth amendment
primarily protects activities in the home, then the Court should
not place such great importance on the intervention of a neutral
magistrate in determining probable cause to search the home. 36
More importantly, the logical implications of the Chief Justice's characterization of the fourth amendment privacy interest
are untenable. Applied expansively, the Chief Justice's definition
results in a complete emasculation of the search warrant requirement. For example, as long as the occupants of a home are known
to be absent, the police would no longer be interfering with activities in the home and thus would be able to search the premises.
Admittedly, the Chief Justice is not advocating such an extreme
position. In fact, by articulating this "securing of the premises" ex131. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
132. 104 S. Ct. at 3389 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
133. See supra text accompanying note 114.
134. Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, noted that interpreting the protection afforded by the fourth amendment requires reference to a "place." Justice Harlan then set
forth the two-prong test for determining when the fourth amendment protects a place. First,
a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Katz, 389 U.S.
at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court explicitly adopted Justice Harlan's twostep test for determining when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
135. In Katz the Court extended fourth amendment protection to defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth. 389 U.S. at 359.
136. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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ception, the Chief Justice is providing police with the time to get a
warrant before searching. Thus, under the Chief Justice's analysis
a significant privacy interest attaches to some property within the
defendant's home-that property which was not seen and thus not
searched when the police illegally entered. Yet, even the Chief Justice recognized that prior to the illegal entry, a privacy interest existed in all those objects inside the defendants' home.3 7 If a privacy interest existed in those objects before entry, the illegal entry
should not dissipate that privacy interest. In Mincey v. Arizona"'s
the Court recognized that a person maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his home even after killing a
policeman on the premises.139 The Segura dissent, therefore, must
be correct in stating that the occupation amounted to an unreasonable continuing search of all those objects that the occupying po14 0
lice officers could see.
The most distressing feature of Segura is that the Chief Justice has created an exception without identifying any corresponding need. All prior opinions recognizing as reasonable certain intrusions into the sanctity of the home carefully defined the needs that
justified those intrusions. In Chimel v. California4 1 the Court held
permissible a search in the "grab area" incident to arrest because
the Court recognized that police officers need to secure their own
safety and prevent the destruction of nearby evidence.14 2 In Vale v.
Louisiana14 3 the Court noted that a warrantless search would be
permissible when evidence is in the process of destruction because
the Court recognized that police officers must prevent evidence
from being lost.14 4 In Mincey v. Arizona14 5 the Court noted that a
limited search of the premises to find victims or dangerous accomplices would be permissible because the Court recognized that the
137. The Chief Justice explicitly recognized that if the initial entry was not supported
by exigent circumstances, then it constituted an unreasonable search of those items in plain
view. 104 S. Ct. at 3389.
138.

437 U.S. 385 (1978).

139. Id. at 394-95. For a discussion of Mincey, see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
141. 395 U.S. 752, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
142. 395 U.S. at 763. For a discussion of Chimel, see supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
143. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
144. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Vale, see supra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text.
145. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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police need to protect themselves and innocent people. 4" In
Segura the Chief Justice held permissible the occupation of the
premises but he did not state any need to remain inside the premises. Clearly, no such need existed-the evidence inside the premises could be secured just as safely by a perimeter stakeout. Arresting all the occupants of the premises eliminated any reason for
remaining inside the house. Because no law enforcement need remained to justify the police presence, any continued occupation
must have been unreasonable.
Furthermore, even if the Segura seizure had been reasonable
at its inception, the eighteen to twenty hour duration of the seizure
cannot be considered reasonable. The Chief Justice recognized that
the occupation constituted an interference with the defendants'
possessory interest in their home,1 47 but found this interference
reasonable in part because the defendants were absent from the
apartment. 148 Again, this holding impermissibly relies upon illegal
arrests to find a subsequent intrusion reasonable. Furthermore,
even if the defendants were absent by their own choice, this holding contravenes the Court's ruling in United States v. Place. 49 In
Place the Court recognized that the owner of a suitcase retained a
possessory interest in his suitcase even after he left it with the police and continued on his way. 50 Place thus suggests that the defendant's absence should not affect the determination of reasonableness. The interference with the defendants' possessory interest
in their house must be circumscribed by the need for the seizure.
Absent a showing of need,'" the Chief Justice should be reluctant
to label as reasonable sloppy police practices resulting in an eighteen to twenty hour, unnecessary occupation of a private dwelling.
Finally, Segura provides little useful guidance in defining the
constitutional limits on the "securing of the premises" exception.
The Arizona Supreme Court recently considered the Chief Jus146. Id. at 392. For a discussion of Mincey, see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying
text.
147. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (discussing that part of the Chief
Justice's opinion in which he implicitly recognizes a possessory interest in the home).
148. See supra note 118.
149. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
150. Id. at 708-09. For a discussion of Place, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text.
151. In Segura the only explanation the Government provided for the delay was that
processing the (illegal) arrests took a long time. The Government did not explain why it did
not use a telephone warrant procedure. See 104 S. Ct. at 3397 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tice's opinion, 1 2 because although the Arizona court realized that
the portion of Segura concerning the "securing of the premises"
exception was not binding precedent, the Arizona court feared that
a majority of the Supreme Court might soon adopt the Chief Justice's analysis. 53 The Arizona court, however, declined to adopt
the Chief Justice's reasoning and determined that the "sanctity of
the home" demanded greater protections than those provided by
Segura. The Arizona court, therefore, held the warrantless entry
and occupation of a home illegal as a matter of Arizona state con15 4
stitutional law absent proof of exigent circumstances.
In another state court case, State v. Riley,155 the Florida Supreme Court relied on the Chief Justice's seizure analysis in
Segura to conclude that a police officer could enter and secure a
house without a search warrant if a judicial officer already had issued the search warrant and the police officer was just waiting for
another officer to deliver the warrant. The Florida court noted that
if a twenty hour seizure in anticipation of an unissued search warrant was held constitutional in Segura, then a ten minute seizure
in anticipation of an issued search warrant also should be constitutional. The Florida court, however, failed to distinguish carefully
the Chief Justice's seizure analysis, which was endorsed by only
two justices, from the rest of the majority opinion.'5 6 The Florida
opinion thus demonstrates the confusion that Segura has created
in the lower courts and the distressing consequences that may stem
from this confusion. Both the Arizona and Florida opinions suggest
the need for a majority of the Court to clarify the ambiguities created by the Chief Justice's Segura opinion.
B.

A Proposal

Given all of these problems with the Chief Justice's ruling in
Segura, the Supreme Court should reformulate the "securing of
the premises" exception. Because all past Supreme Court prece152. See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984).
153. Id. at 264, 689 P.2d at 523.
154. Id. at 264-65, 689 P.2d at 523-24. This holding notwithstanding, the Bolt court
admitted the evidence by relying on the Supreme Court's independent source analysis. For
an explanation of the independent source rule, see supra note 103.
155. 462 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1984).
156. The Florida court quoted a passage from the beginning of the Segura opinion in
which the Chief Justice explained the points of law that would be covered by the opinion.
Id. at 802. The point of law quoted, however, dealt with the Chief Justice's seizure analysis
and this seizure analysis was not endorsed by the majority of the Segura Court. See supra
note 104.
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dent has erected a constitutional barrier at the door to the premises, the Supreme Court should clarify the exigencies that allow the
police to enter and secure a home to preserve the status quo. A
synthesis of the circuit court opinions provides a well-developed
fourth amendment analysis for the Supreme Court to consider.
The Court should adopt the following three-prong test, which at
least one commentator has advocated in part"' and the circuits
have adopted: (1) police officers must have probable cause to believe evidence is on the premises, and delaying entry must create
the substantial risk that evidence will be lost or destroyed; 158 (2)
the critical nature of the circumstances must prevent the use of
any warrant procedure, including the telephone warrant; 159 and (3)
the police must not be responsible for creating their own exigencies. 160 This three-prong test weighs the law enforcement need to
preserve evidence against the individual's privacy interest in maintaining the sanctity of the home. The Court should require careful
review of police decisions to enter the premises.' 6 ' The substantial
infringement on privacy that may follow from a warrantless entry
demands rigid enforcement of the three-prong test.
After entry, police officers should be allowed to conduct a limited security check to determine if anyone is present who might
destroy evidence or pose a threat to police safety.

62

If police of-

ficers find occupants on the premises, but lack probable cause to
arrest these people, the Court should recognize that the least significant intrusion is to detain"6 " the people16 4 until a warrant ar157. See Note, supra note 24, at 1480 (proposing a statute that would allow the impoundment of a premises under certain conditions).
158. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 100.
161. For an example of an inappropriately deferential approach to appellate review of
exigent circumstances decisions, see supra notes 60-66 accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
163. "Detain" in the context of this proposal allows police to remain on the premises
in order to watch occupants and to force them to stay in a central location. If an occupant
were to insist on going to the bathroom, sufficient exigencies would exist for police to first
search the occupant and the bathroom because evidence can be destroyed easily in
bathrooms.
164. The term "people" includes any person who is present when police enter the
premises as well as residents who arrive after police have secured the premises. A "resident"
includes anyone who is staying at the premises more than 24 hours, including an out-oftown visitor. If a person who is not a resident seeks entry subsequent to the securing of the
premises police should be able to deny this person the right to enter. This rule is justified
because a nonresident, by definition, has someplace else to stay.
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rives rather than searching the premises.' 65 Of course, allowing police to detain the occupants raises constitutional questions. The
Court, however, should recognize that the same exigent circumstances that justify the warrantless entry into the home also justify
the limited detention or search of the occupants. 166 Police applying
this procedure in previous cases have either detained all the occupants or told the occupants they could leave only if they consented
to a search of their persons. 67 Nonetheless, this police presence
constitutes a very significant intrusion of an occupant's right to
privacy and should be narrowly circumscribed by police need. Because of these potential complications, the Supreme Court should
require the use of the telephone warrant procedure, whenever possible, to keep the occupation as brief 6 8 and unintrusive as
possible. 6
165. Given the significant nature of this intrusion, some courts and commentators
have suggested that a search would entail a lesser intrusion. See, e.g., Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 775 n.5 (White, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); W. LAFAvE,
supra note 24, § 6.5(c), at 452-55. Commentators responding to this suggestion point out
that if the detained occupant lives on the premises, then he can consent to a search and
decide for himself which invasion constitutes the lesser intrusion. See Kelder & Statman,
supra note 24, at 1004; Note, supra note 24, at 1482.
166. Cf. United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985) (holding that a person may be
stopped and detained because of a flyer circulated by another "police" department indicating that the person is wanted for the investigation of a felony, as long as that flyer is based
upon a reasonable suspicion that the person was involved in a criminal activity); United
States v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (holding that the significant interest school officials
have in maintaining an environment conducive to learning justifies permitting a warrantless
search of a student if that search is based upon a reasonable suspicion that the student has
violated or is violating the law or school rules and if the scope of the search is reasonably
related to the circumstances which justified the initial interference); Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692 (1981) (allowing the limited detention of persons while authorities search the
premises pursuant to a valid search warrant).
167. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (securing the premises by
informing occupants that they could leave only if they consented to a bodily search); United
States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983) (detaining all occupants of a house for four
hours until the search warrant arrived); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 467 (1st
Cir. 1979) (lower court noted that the agents "acknowledged that they would not have permitted anyone to leave the premises.") (quoting United States v. Edwards, 443 F. Supp. 192,
195 (D. Mass. 1977)); United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184 (1st Cir.) (securing the
premises by informing occupants that they were free to go, but could not take any property
with them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979).
168. "Brief" in the context of this proposal means the time it would take for officers to
procure a telephone warrant. At least one court has held that an hour and fifteen minutes is
adequate time to obtain a telephone search warrant. See United States v. Baker, 520 F.
Supp. 1080, 1083 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
169. This proposal is applicable only in jurisdictions adopting a telephone search warrant procedure and suggests the need for more state jurisdictions to adopt such a procedure.
For a list of the states that have adopted a telephone warrant procedure as of the time of
this writing, see supra note 71.
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If the security check subsequent to entry reveals that no occupants are present, or if police officers arrest all the occupants, then
the Court should recognize that police have no legitimate reason to
remain on the premises 17 0 and should require police to leave. The
Court should hold that the proper procedure for maintaining the
status quo when police have no reasonable belief that people are
inside the premises, or have determined no one is on the premises,
is to conduct an external stakeout. An external stakeout is, in effect, a seizure of the entire premises. The circuits are divided on
this issue, 17 1 but the Chief Justice's seizure analysis 172 properly
suggests that an external seizure constitutes a lesser intrusion than
a search because an external seizure interferes only with occupants'
possessory interest in their residence. Therefore, the public interest in preserving evidence inside the residence justifies allowing
police to impound the premises from the outside. Such an impoundment would include preventing anyone from entering the
residence until the search warrant arrives. This impoundment,
however, is reasonable only for a short period of time."7 3 Courts
should not accept administrative delays such as those advanced in
Segura as reasonable. Again, the Court should demand the use of
the telephone warrant procedure when available.
When police suspect that occupants are inside the premises,
but have no reason to believe that they will destroy evidence
before a warrant arrives, allowing the impoundment of the premises is problematic. First, the impoundment process may alert the
occupants to the need to destroy evidence. Sanctioning entry at
this point, however, would impermissibly allow police to create
their own exigencies. Second, even if the impoundment process
does not directly alert the occupants, a third person may seek entry and be stopped. The police would have to detain this person or
he could notify the occupants and they could destroy evidence.
Under Terry v. Ohio 7 4 a brief detention is reasonable, but a brief
period of time may be insufficient to obtain a warrant. Allowing
detention of this person for an indefinite period of time would be
the equivalent of arresting the person on less than probable cause,
170. See supra text accompanying notes 141-46 (discussing cases in which the Court
allowed an exception to the warrant requirement only after recognizing a legitimate law
enforcement need).
171. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying and following note 54.
174. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of the Terry line of cases, see supra note 54.
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because no independent exigencies 175 justify the detention. Therefore, when police know that people are on the premises, but do not
reasonably believe that they will destroy evidence, the Court
should require police to continue surveillance operations until a
warrant arrives or exigent circumstances arise.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The fourth amendment provides protections against unreasonable intrusions into the home. In Segura, however, two Supreme
Court Justices unnecessarily expanded an exception to this protection. The "securing of the premises" exception must be strictly circumscribed by law enforcement need. The Court should place
more emphasis on the privacy interest in the home by redefining
the "securing of the premises" exception to balance more carefully
the government's interest in preserving evidence against the privacy interest in the home. At the very least, the Court should clarify the practical applications of the "securing of the premises" exception to prevent the confusion resulting from lower courts'
attempts to apply Segura to police actions. Only by reaffirming the
privacy interest in the home can the Court prevent lower courts
and prosecutors from relying on Segura to dangerously erode
fourth amendment protections.
ADAM KENNEDY PECK*

175. The term "independent exigencies" refers to exigencies not created by the police.
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